Frank H. Fullmer v. Parley J. Baker : Respondent\u27s Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1973
Frank H. Fullmer v. Parley J. Baker : Respondent's
Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Lowell Hawkes; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Fullmer v. Baker, No. 12969 (Utah Supreme Court, 1973).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3253
-THE SUPREME·_.·;·:;-
THE STATE OP'.~,~ . 
. :: .·,,4:~1 
H. PULi.MER., 
Plamti/fReJ;tJ·-~ 
vs. 
·' 
INDEX 
Page 
NATURE OF THE CASE ------------------------------------------------ 1 
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT ------------------------------ 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------ 1 
FACTS------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L 
DEFENDANT NEVER MADE A PROPER OR 
TIMELY TENDER OF PERFORMANCE ______________ 4 
POINT IL 
DEFENDANT'S TOTAL NON - PERFORMANCE 
GAVE PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO ELECT RE-
SCISSION OR SUE FOR DAMAGES ______________________ 7 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT 
THE UNREGISTERED SHARES OF I.F.C. WERE 
ENCUMBERED ------------------------------------------------------ 9 
CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------··········-------····· 13 
CASES CITED 
Guinand v. Walton, 
22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P.2d 467 ( 1969) -------·-··········· 12 
Lal!'son v. Woodmen of the U:' orld, 
88 Utah 267, 53 P.2d 432 (1936) -··········--·-········· 8
Plain City Irrigation Co. v. Hooper Irrigation Co., 
11 Utah 2d 188, 356 P.2d 625 ( 1960) .................... 12 
Pool v. Motter, 
55 Utah 288, 185 P. 714 ( 1919) ............................ 7 
INDEX (Continued) 
Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke & Co., 
134 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1943) -----------------..... 
Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 
92 Utah 264, 67 P.2d 632 ( 1937) 
STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
17 A C.].S. 682, Contracts §482 ( 1963) ....................... . 
17 A C.J.S. 683, Contracts §482 ( 1963) .......................... . 
17 A C.J.S. 684, Contracts §486 ( 1963) ....................... . 
Shea, "A Practical Look at the Securities Laws Restrictiom 
on Sales by Owners of Unregistered Stock" 43 U. Del. 
L.]. 572 ( 1966) -------------------------------------------········· 
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-7 ------------···································· 
Websters New International Dictionary, 
843 ( 2d Ed. 195 7) -------------------------------------············ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK H. FULLMER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
PARLEY J. BAKER, 
Def endant-Appellctnt. 
Case No. 
12969 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in contract. 
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted judgment in favor of the plain-
riff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the lower court's judgment 
in his favor. 
FACTS 
Plaintiff does not agree with defendant's statement of 
facts as it is incomplete and not a presentation of the facts 
in tht light most favorable to the verdict as is required on ap-
]X'al. The following statement of facts is therefore submitted: 
1 
Defendant Baker is the president of "I F C,, 
ally bankrupt Utah corporation (R.17). Th~ ~l~in:i~/'~r 
t b . d ,arr racror, ecame acquamte with the defendant h h' ·· w en ud 
do some remodeling of some of the restaurants to h' h " 
W IC ]f, 
had granted franchises. · 
On several occasions defendant represented to plain: 
that I.F.C. was "going to go public." (R. 1, 101; Ex. J.D 
In reliance upon those representations the plaintiff paid 
1 
fendant. $5,000 for which he was to receive 20,000 sham, 
defendant's own I.F.C. stock (R. 69, 74). Several weeks~· 
paying the $ 5 ,000 the defendant presented to plaintiff a wric. 
agreement reflecting the transaction ( R. 67, 80). The a@t 
ment ( R. 9) had been drafted by the defendant (R. 941.. 
provided in paragraph 2 for delivery of the shares "withm.: 
year from the date" of the agreement (March 15, 19701. 
paragraph 3, that the shares would be "free from all en(U[ 
brances," and in paragraph 4, that the shares would be "ire; 
erly endorsed for transfer." When he signed the agreem[ 
plaintiff asked for the stock certificate. Defendant replied tl; 
the certificate would be mailed ( R. 68, 7 6) . 
Defendant neither mailed the certificate as prorniseo i 
took any steps, such as a simple diary date, to see that rlac 
tiff received his shares in I.F.C. within the maximum t!IT 
provided by the agreement (R. 95-96). 
Defendant had done nothing to inform plaintiff of k 
whereabouts during the year following the making of rr 
agreement. The agreement represented defendant as ~c 
from Provo ( R. 9) . But after time for performance had
1
lar 
. "ff h out de enu" it later became necessary for plamt1 to searc 
at his new location in Orem (Ex. 3-P) · 
2 
Plaintiff's name was never entered on the corporate rec-
ords as a shareholder and plaintiff never received any com-
munication from I.F.C., such as notice of a shareholders meet-
in.:;, prior to filing this action ( R. 172, 68, 69). After the 
curiipiaint was filed, however, the defendant phoned plaintiff 
and invited him to a directors meeting ( R. 69, 82). 
The shares of I.F.C. were never registered with the state 
or ftderal government (R. l 7a, 60, 73). 
Prior to filing this suit plaintiff's attorney wrote defend-
ant pointing out defendant's total non-performance, demand-
mg reurn of the $5,000 and offering to work out repayment 
terms. Defendant did not bother to respond to that letter (R. 
1 S, 84). A second letter (Ex. 3-P) was then sent to defendant 
to which defendant's attorney eventually responded (R. 85, 
Ex. 4-PJ. 
At trial defendant offered to produce the shares which 
11tre the subject of the parties' agreement and which defend-
ant claimed would constitute performance by him (Ex. 2-P). 
The stock certificate offered was clearly deficient. It 
still bore the name of the defendant and the endorsement on 
the back was improper and incomplete in several material re-
spects: it was incomplete as to the number of shares being 
transferred, if any; it was incomplete as to the appointment of 
a transfer agent; and it was neither witnessed nor dated. In-
deed, the only blanks filled in, plaintiff's name and defend-
ant's signature, had been entered by defendant in pencil (R. 
92; Ex. 2-P) ! 
3 
--
The trial court heard the evidence and argum 
ent ot 
counsel, allowed additional time for legal memorand . 
. . a~ 
then found all issues rn favor of the plaintiff. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of La~ 
are found in the appeal record at R. 17-19. Among other 
things the court found that the defendant had materiallr 
breached the agreement of March 15, 1970 in every respec;, 
that plaintiff had fully performed, and that plaintiff was there 
fore entitled to rescind the agreement and have his $5,00~ 
returned. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT NEVER MADE A PROPER OR 
TIMELY TENDER OF PERFORMANCE 
Defendant argues without supporting authority or reason, 
that time was not the essence of the parties' agreement because 
the contract did not so specifically state. Defendant even claims 
at page 4 of his brief that "the law is clear" in this regard. 
The contract, however, is clear and unambiguous as re· 
gards the time for performance. 
"2. Baker agrees to convey to Fullmer within one 
year from the date hereof {March 15, 1970} 20,00~ 
shares of ... 1.F.C. .... " (R. 9). 
The tender of performance, therefore, was required within 
· ·1 t s to the time already stated. Only when a contract 1s s1 en a 
the time of performance is one allowed, what defendant now 
argues, a reasonable time for performance. 17 A C.J.S. 6S: 
Contracts § 482 (1963). 
4 
A 
Defendant's claim at page 4 of his brief that failure to 
JJiver the shares within the year was "inadvertent" is unsup-
ported by the record; the evidence is to the contrary. Defend-
ant was extremely indifferent, if not scheming, with regard 
ro his contractual obligations. He never made so much as a 
srniple diary record to assure delivery of the shares within the 
maxim um time required ( R. 95, 96) . He moved from Provo 
to Orem after making the contract and did not inform plain-
tiff of his whereabouts (R. 9, Ex. 3-P). He could easily have 
mailed the shares to plaintiff as promised but he did not ( R. 
68, 7 6) . Indeed defendant was so indifferent to plaintiff's in-
tercsts that he ignored even the first demand letter from plain-
tiff's attorney ( R. 18, 84-85). 
Defendant again misstates the facts at page 7 of his brief 
where he speaks of the plaintiff's intention "not to perform." 
Such a statement is incredible in light of the fact that plaintiff 
had fully performed every obligation of the contract as found 
by the trial court (R. 18 - Finding of Fact No. 16). 
Defendant's argument under Point I is also fatally defec-
tive in that it assumes a critical element the trial court specifi-
cally rejected: that a proper tender was ever made. A tender 
of performance is never sufficient unless it is tender in accord-
ance with the terms of the contract. 
"(A} tender which does not conform to the contract 
is the same as no tender at all. The tenderer must do 
and offer everything that is necessary on his part to 
complete the transaction, and must fairly make known 
his purpose without ambiguity. 
* * * 
"The tender . . . must be definite and certain in 
character . " 17 A C.J.S. 684, 685, Contracts § 486 
(1963). 
5 
Defendant's tender was indefinite, ambiguous d 
. . an not 
rn conformance with what the contract required· Th . 
· e Stork 
certificate offered at trial had never even been seen by th 1. e pain 
tiff prior to that time ( R. 18, Finding 15); it was made 
0 
· 
Ut tn 
the defendant's name and the claimed endorsement on tht 
back was pencilled in, incomplete, and therefore ambiguous IIl 
several material aspects (Ex. 2-P) . This lead the trial coun • 
to properly conclude: 
"5. The certificate ... produced at trial by the de. 
fendant was incompletely and ineffectively endorsed." 
(R. 18-19). 
Even if the endorsement had been legally sufficient me 1 
shares themselves did not conform with the contract terms as 
they were not "free from all encumbrances" as required 01 
paragraph 4 of the parties' agreement (R. 19, Conclusion No. 
6) . This is discussed further under Point III of this brief. 
Defendant's claimed tender was also untimely: 
"In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, it~ 
no defense to an action for breach of contract that per· 
formance was tendered after the action was commenc· 
ed." 17 A C.J.S. 683, Contracts § 482 ( 1963). 
With regard to defendant's duty under paragraph 2 of me 
agreement to "convey to Fullmer within one year," the trial 
court found that: 
"7. The defendant never transferred or conveyed to 
the plaintiff . . . any shares of ... I.F.C." (R. 191 
(Italics added). 
Defense counsel admitted to the propriety of that Findini. 
'l al as concerns the total lack of any conveyance prior to ma ' 
evidenced by its own proffered Conclusion of Law No. 7 whi~ 
incorporates all of the above language ( R. 25) · 
6 
The court recognized early that there was a question 
whether a tender has been made (R. 61) and invited defense 
counsel to offer its evidence as it had the burden of proving 
a proper tender ( R. 64) . The court made no Conclusions of 
Law that there was a proper tender ( R. 18, 19). Defense 
counsel in his motion to amend the Conclusions of Law moved 
for a Conclusion that a proper tender had been made, (R. 25) 
but the trial court rejected that suggested amendment (R. 
33,34). 
Defendant's tender being both improper and untimely it 
was legally no tender at all. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S TOTAL NON-PERFORMANCE 
GAVE PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO ELECT RE-
SCISSION OR SUE FOR DAMAGES. 
Defendant's argument in Point II totally ignores the well-
established principle of election of remedies by claiming plain-
tiff's only remedy for defendant's total breach was damages. 
In Pool v. Motter, 55 Utah 288, 185 P. 714, 715 ( 1919) 
the court set forth what it recognized as the "general rule" 
with regard to rescission: 
"If a contract is entire, and remains executory in whole 
or in part, and one party fails to perform what it is his 
duty to do under the contract, and the other party is 
not in default, the latter may rescind the contract." 
In Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 92 Utah 264, 
67 P.2d 632 (1937) the appellant challenged, as does the de-
fendant-appellant in this case, the right to rescind a contract 
simply for breach thereof. The court in Hintze reaffirmed the 
right to rescind the contract or recover damages: 
7 
"(The} breach of ... a covenant which goes h 
h l "d . f tot l w o e cons1 eratton o a contract, gives the in' . 
h . h . d )Uftc party t e rig t to rescm a contract, or to treat it Ji 
broken and to recover damages for a total breach." 6. 
P.2d at 638. 
The requisite conditions of Pool v. Motter and Sidne 
) 
Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze also exist in this case: plain. 
tiff had fully performed under the contract, defendant hai 
failed totally to perform as required, the defendant's breach 
in every material respect went to the whole consideration ol 
the contract, and plaintiff made a proper election to rescind. 
The trial court's Findings were therefore totally within the 
framework of long-established legal principles: 
"2. Defendant's breach constituted a material anc 
essential obligation to be performed under the con 
tract which was not severable. 
* * * 
"4. Plaintiff was properly entitled to rescind the 
agreement .... " (R. 18). 
Nothing hampered defendant's ability to perform :li 
required other than his own apparent indifference to the obliga· 
tions which flowed from the agreement he himself drafted 
He should not now be heard to complain of the legal canst 
quences brought about by his own inaction. Defendant's con· 
duct falls within the admonition of Lawson v. Woodmen ol 
the World, 88 Utah 267, 53 P.2d 432, 435 (1936): 
"They seek to accept the benefits of the contract, but 
avoid the full force of its obligations. This they can 
not do." 
8 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT 
THE UNREGISTERED SHARES OF I.F.C. WERE 
ENCUMBERED. 
Defendant drafted the agreement which is the subject of 
this suit ( R. 17, 94). Paragraph 3 of that agreement repre-
sented and warranted that the shares to be conveyed would 
be "free from all encumbrances." Defendant challenges in 
Point III the trial court's Conclusion of Law No. 6 (R. 19) 
that the shares were not free from encumbrances. 
The trial court's conclusion that the shares were not 
free from encumbrances was based upon a realistic look at 
the consequences of owning unregistered securities. A basic 
principle under both the state and federal securities acts is that 
all shares must be registered unless entitled to some exemption, 
which exemption the seller of unregisterd securities has the 
burden of proving. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 provides: 
"It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any 
security in this state unless it is registered under this 
act or the security or transaction is exempted under Sec-
tion 61-1-14." 
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 ( 15 U.S.C. §77e) 
is similar to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-7 and confers federal 
jurisdiction over any transaction which makes use of the mails 
or other instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Federal juris-
diction is easily acquired. In Schillner v. H. Vaughan Clarke 
& Co., 134 F.2d 875 ( 2d Cir. 1943) the court upheld federal 
jurisdiction over a transaction in which the only element of 
interstate commerce was use of the mails for delivery of the 
certificates after the transaction had been consummated with-
out the use of any other element of interstate commerce. 
9 
A discontented purchaser of unregistered securit' 
1es nttu 
only plead the unregistered status of the shares and th 
shift the heavy burden of proof upon the seller. Surely 
0
: 
who can sell his securities only under threat of potential legai 
action by the state or federal government or the purchaser he 
shares which are "encumbered" in every practical applicatioo 
of the word. 
The Federal Securities and Exchange Commission hai 
established rules directed to transactions in unregistered se 
curities. The obvious intent and effect of these rules is to en 
cumber or hinder, the free trading of unregistered securitic; 
Rule 144 of the Securities and Exchange Commission is onl! 
one of several rules which present major limitations on trading 
unregistered securities. Among the several requirements oi 
Rule 144 are the following: 
(1) 
(2) 
The person for whose account the securities ait 
sold must have been the beneficial owner of the 
securities for a period of at least two years prior 
to the sale, and 
There must be available at the time of the salt 
"adequate current public information" with re 
spect to the issuer of the securities (in this case. 
I.F.C. Corporation). 
Surely one who owns property which he cannot legall1 
resell for a minimum of two years owns property which ii 
"encumbered." 
Likewise, where a shareholder, such as plaintiff woula 
have been, has no power or authority to make available 
bl · · f · " b t the issuer com· "adequate current pu 1c m ormat10n a ou 
pany he is in an encumbered position with regard to tho~ 
securities. 
10 
In 1966 a practICmg lawyer and law professor, Edward 
E. Shea, published an article dealing with the practical prob-
lems inherent in any sale of unregistered securities. His article 
appeared in 13 Univ. of Detroit Law Journal 572 and was 
titled: "A Practical Look at the Securities Laws Restrictions on 
Sales by Owners of Unregistered Stock." The article is well 
written and detailed. It was considered by Judge Baldwin in 
the judgment he rendered for plaintiff. Its conclusion is di-
rected to practicing lawyers and sounds a warning: 
"Unless and until amendments such as those discussed 
. . . are adopted, even the most practical lawyer will 
be unable to remove all complications faced by his 
clients who own or wish to purchase unregistered 
stock." Id. at 602 (Italics added.) 
Where, as attorney Shea warns, even the "most practical 
lawyer" will have trouble with the legal complications of a 
transaction in unregistered securities, the same transaction is 
surely much more cumbersome and fraught with legal impli-
cations where handled by a layman. 
The trial court wisely kept sight of these facts in holding 
the I.F.C. securities were not free from encumbrances as re· 
quired by the contract. 
Defendant argues a non sequitur in Point III by claiming 
that because the word "encumbrance" is most often applied to 
real property transactions it has no application to the contract 
he himself drafted for the sale of personal property. 
To have warranted that the shares would be "free from all 
encumbrances" and then argue that such language should be 
ignored is blatantly inconsistent and self-serving. 
11 
The best argument defendant can make is th . 
f 
~ ~ 
rom all encumbrances" is ambiguous. That howe " ' ver, wou[: 
only mean that the ambiguity should be construed · ' against tk 
defendant, the drafter of the instrument and in fav f •· ' or 0 tn' 
plaintiff thus supporting the trial court's i'udgment Gz · 1' · 11n,m1. : 
Walton. 22 Utah 2d 196, 459 P.2d 467, 469 (1969). 
In determining the meaning to be applied to "free from 
all encumbrances" the trial court considered, in addition tu 
those things already mentioned, the advice of Plain City lrri,1i 
tion Co. v. Hooper Irrigation Co., 11 Utah 2d 188, 356 P.1u 
625 ( 1960): 
• 
'The beginning point of interpretation of a contract 1, ' 
an examination of the language used in accordan(t 
with the ordinary and usual meaning of the wora< 
used .... " 356 P.2d at 627. 
The ordinary and usual meaning of "encumbrance" ~ 
defined by Webster is: 
"1. State of being encumbered; perplexity; troublt 
2. That which encumbers; a burden that impedes"' 
tion or motion, or renders it difficult or laborio11J' 
impediment." Websters New International Dictionar, 
843 ( 2d Ed. 195 7) (Italics added.) 
The trial court applied the ordinary and usual meanin~ 
of "encumbrance" to the transaction between the parties an~ 
properly found the defendant could not produce shares whirr 
·were "free from all encumbrances" as required by the parttei 
agreement. That decision was realistic and based upon prope: 
legal principles and should therefore be affirmed. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
The agreement between the parties was drafted by the 
Jefrndant. Plaintiff had fully performed under that agreement 
even prior to his signing by paying $5,000 to defendant. The 
agreement required defendant to convey to plaintiff properly 
endorsed unencumbered shares by March 15, 1971. On that 
date defendant had done nothing towards performance. He 
had even moved out of the town where the agreement repre-
sented he lived without informing plaintiff. He was forced to 
admit at trial he never took any steps even to remind him of 
his duty of performance. 
Defendant's complaints to this court are nothing more 
than uphappiness with the proper legal consequences of his 
own disinterest in keeping his part of the bargain. Had he 
been even half as concerned with his obligations after taking 
plaintiff's money this appeal would not now be before this 
court. 
The trial court applied proper principles of Utah law to 
the credible facts developed at trial. Its judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOWELL N. HAWKES of 
WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintif !-Respondent 
7th Floor, Continental .Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
13 
Served the foregoing Brief by mailing two copies thereof 
to Ralph ]. Marsh, Deseret Buildi~g, S~l~!;t City, Utan 
84111, Attorney for Appellant, this -----'--'------- day of Fe~ 
ruary, 1973. 
14 
